Kant on Animal Consciousness

Abstract
Kant is often considered to have argued that perceptual awareness of objects in one's environment depends on the subject's possession of conceptual capacities. This conceptualist interpretation raises an immediate problem concerning the nature of perceptual awareness in non-rational, non-concept using animals. In this paper I argue that Kant’s claims concerning animal representation and consciousness do not foreclose the possibility of attributing to animals the capacity for objective perceptual consciousness, and that a non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s position concerning perceptual awareness can actively endorse this attribution. Kant can consistently allow that animals have a point of view on the objective world which possesses a distinctive phenomenal character while denying what seems most important to him – viz. that animals have the capacity to take cognitive attitudes towards, and thus self-ascribe, their own representational states.
Keywords Animals  Philosophy of Mind  Kant  Consciousness  Representation  Concepts  Non-conceptual content
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,810
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Consciousness as Inner Sensation: Crusius and Kant.Jonas Jervell Indregard - forthcoming - Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
The Kantian (Non)‐Conceptualism Debate.Colin McLear - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):769-790.
Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)?Kevin Connolly - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):316-337.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Kant's Treatment of Animals.Holly L. Wilson - 2011 - In Paul Pojman (ed.), Food Ethics. Wadsworth.
Animals, Consciousness, and I-Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2009 - In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. pp. 184--200.
Representation and a Science of Consciousness.Andrew R. Bailey - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):62-76.
Constituting the Mind: Kant, Davidson, and the Unity of Consciousness.Jeff Malpas - 1999 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1):1-30.
Duties Regarding Animals.Patrick Kain - 2010 - In Lara Denis (ed.), Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press. pp. 210--233.
Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto.Mark Rowlands - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
The Evolution of Consciousness.E. M. Macphail - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Added to PP index
2011-12-01

Total downloads
107 ( #48,596 of 2,202,780 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #44,528 of 2,202,780 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature