Knowledge of necessity: Logical positivism and Kripkean essentialism

Philosophy 83 (324):179-191 (2008)
Abstract
By the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necessary truth that we know, we know it a priori and for every contingent truth that we know, we know it a posteriori. Kripke attacks on both flanks, arguing that we know necessary a posteriori truths and that we probably know contingent a priori truths. In a reflection of Kripke's confidence in his own arguments, the first of these Kripkean claims is far more widely accepted than the second. Contrary to received opinion, the paper argues, the considerations Kripke adduces concerning truths purported to be necessary a posteriori do not disprove the logical positivist thesis that necessary truth and a priori truth are co-extensive
Keywords necessity  logical positivism  essentialism  Ayer, A.J.  Kripke, S.A.  modal knowledge  modal epistemology  necessary a posteriori
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819108000454
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Proper Names, Contingency A Priori and Necessity A Posteriori.Chen Bo - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2):119 - 138.

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