Philosophy 83 (2):179-191 (2008)

Authors
Stephen K. McLeod
University of Liverpool
Abstract
By the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necessary truth that we know, we know it a priori and for every contingent truth that we know, we know it a posteriori. Kripke attacks on both flanks, arguing that we know necessary a posteriori truths and that we probably know contingent a priori truths. In a reflection of Kripke's confidence in his own arguments, the first of these Kripkean claims is far more widely accepted than the second. Contrary to received opinion, the paper argues, the considerations Kripke adduces concerning truths purported to be necessary a posteriori do not disprove the logical positivist thesis that necessary truth and a priori truth are co-extensive
Keywords necessity  logical positivism  essentialism  Ayer, A.J.  Kripke, S.A.  modal knowledge  modal epistemology  necessary a posteriori
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0031819108000454
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Identity and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1971 - In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press. pp. 135-164.
Kripke on Necessity a Posteriori.Pavel Tichý - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (2):225 - 241.
Are There Necessary a Posteriori Truths?G. W. Fitch - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (4):243 - 247.
Melia on Modalism.Graeme Forbes - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (1):57 - 63.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Rationalism and Modal Knowledge.Stephen K. McLeod - 2009 - Critica 41 (122):29-42.
Proper Names, Contingency A Priori and Necessity A Posteriori.Chen Bo - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2):119 - 138.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
181 ( #55,258 of 2,432,313 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #83,835 of 2,432,313 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes