Mental causation and Shoemaker-realization

Erkenntnis 67 (2):149 - 172 (2007)

Abstract
Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a new definition of `realization’ and used it to try to explain how mental events can be causes within the framework of a non-reductive physicalism. I argue that it is not actually his notion of realization that is doing the work in his account of mental causation, but rather the assumption that certain physical properties entail mental properties that do not entail them. I also point out how his account relies on certain other controversial assumptions, including analytical filler-functionalism for mental properties, and the assumption that causes must be proportional to their effects. I conclude by pointing out that Shoemaker has provided no explanation of why, on his view, certain physical properties entail mental properties
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-007-9069-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 46,223
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Mental Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Readings in Philosophy of Psychology.Ned Block (ed.) - 1980 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Thoughts on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization.Jaegwon Kim - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):101 - 112.
Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review.David Pineda & Agustín Vicente - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):97-120.
Guidelines for Theorizing About Realization.Kevin Morris - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (4):393-416.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Taking Realization Seriously: No Cure for Epiphobia. [REVIEW]Sven Walter - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):207 - 226.
Thoughts on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization.Jaegwon Kim - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):101 - 112.
Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):1-23.
The Properties of Mental Causation.David Robb - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
172 ( #46,662 of 2,285,692 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #158,444 of 2,285,692 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature