On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism
In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press (1992)
Abstract
[Why Davidson's Anomalous Monism Would Lead to Type Epiphenomenalism]: 1. According to Davidson, events can cause other events only in virtue of falling under physical types cited in strict laws; 2. But no mental event-type is a physical event-type cited in a strict law, since the mental is anomalous. 3. Therefore, under Davidson's theory, type epiphenomenalism is trueMy notes
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