On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104 (2020)
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Abstract

Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing.

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Colin McLear
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Citations of this work

Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):661-686.
Kant’s Account of Epistemic Normativity.Reza Hadisi - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
Rationality: What Difference Does It Make?Colin McLear - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-26.
Kant and the Fate of Freedom: 1788-1800.Owen Ware - forthcoming - In Joe Saunders (ed.), Freedom After Kant. London, UK:

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References found in this work

The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

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