Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (1):79-110 (2015)
I argue that Kant’s distinction between the cognitive roles of sensibility and understanding raises a question concerning the conditions necessary for objective representation. I distinguish two opposing interpretive positions—viz. Intellectualism and Sensibilism. According to Intellectualism all objective representation depends, at least in part, on the unifying synthetic activity of the mind. In contrast, Sensibilism argues that at least some forms of objective representation, specifically intuitions, do not require synthesis. I argue that there are deep reasons for thinking that Intellectualism is incompatible with Kant's view as expressed in the Transcendental Aesthetic. We can better see how Kant’s arguments in the first Critique may be integrated, I suggest, by examining his notion of the 'unity' [Einheit] of a representation. I articulate two distinct ways in which a representation may possess unity and claim that we can use these notions to integrate Kant’s arguments in the Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction without compromising the core claims of either Sensibilism or Intellectualism—that intuition is a form of objective representation independent of synthesis, and that the kind of objective representations that ground scientific knowledge of the world require synthesis by the categories.
|Keywords||Kant Conceptualism Non-conceptualism Intuition Concepts Animals|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Kant's Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical‐Historical Commentary, by Henry Allison. Oxford University Press, 2015, 496 Pp. ISBN 13: 978‐0‐19‐872485‐8 Hb £75.00. [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):546-554.
Self-Affection and Pure Intuition in Kant.Jonas Jervell Indregard - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
Attention and Synthesis in Kant's Conception of Experience.Melissa Merritt & Valaris Markos - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268):571-592.
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