Why essentialism requires two senses of necessity

Ratio 19 (1):77–91 (2006)
Abstract
I set up a dilemma, concerning metaphysical modality de re, for the essentialist opponent of a ‘two senses’ view of necessity. I focus specifically on Frank Jackson's two-dimensional account in his From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). I set out the background to Jackson's conception of conceptual analysis and his rejection of a two senses view. I proceed to outline two purportedly objective (as opposed to epistemic) differences between metaphysical and logical necessity. I conclude that since one of these differences must hold and since each requires the adoption of a two senses view of necessity, essentialism is not consistent with the rejection of a two senses view.
Keywords essentialism  necessity  Frank Jackson
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00310.x
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References found in this work BETA
Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Sameness and Substance Renewed.David Wiggins - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

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