Why intentional systems theory cannot reconcile physicalism with realism about belief and desire

ProtoSociology 14:145-157 (2000)
In this paper, I examine Daniel Dennett’s well-known intentional systems theory of belief and desire from the perspective of physicalism. I begin with a general discussion of physicalism. In the course of that discussion, I present familiar ways that one might attempt to reconcile physicalism with belief-desire realism. I then argue that intentional systems theory will not provide a reconciliation of physicalism and belief-desire realism.
Keywords Belief  Desire  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Realism  Systems Theory  Dennett, D
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ISBN(s) 1434-4319
DOI 10.5840/protosociology2000149
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