What is Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):273–290 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Sidgwick's ‘Dualism of Practical Reason’ has attracted the attention of many interpreters, and the Dualism itself seems to be an historically important version of the view, recently defended by Thomas Nagel, Susan Wolf, and others, that there exists a fundamental fragmentation of value – that the ‘cosmos of duty is reduced to chaos,’ in Sidgwick's words. In this paper, I consider and reject the leading interpretations of Sidgwick's Dualism, and propose an alternative reading. I conclude by offering what I hope is a plausible but Sidgwickian way out of the Dualism.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,385

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
111 (#159,062)

6 months
9 (#449,120)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Owen McLeod
Lafayette College

Citations of this work

Consequentialism, Demandingness and the Monism of Practical Reason.Brian McElwee - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):359-374.
On the Absence of Moral Goodness in Hobbes’s Ethics.Johan Olsthoorn - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (2):241-266.
Should We Replace Disabled Newborn Infants?Dominic Wilkinson - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (3):390-414.
Economic Rationality and a Moral Science of Business Ethics.Duane Windsor - 2016 - Philosophy of Management 15 (2):135-149.
Sidgwick's Distinction Passage.Robert Shaver - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (4):444-453.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references