Causing Disabled People to Exist and Causing People to Be Disabled

Ethics 116 (1):77-99 (2005)

Authors
Jeff McMahan
Oxford University
Abstract
Attempts to determine or to select what kind of person or people to bring into existence are controversial. This is particularly true of “negative selection” or “selecting against” a certain type of person—that is, the attempt to prevent a person of a certain type, or people of that type, from existing. Virtually everyone agrees that some instances of negative selection are objectionable—for example, that selection against healthy people would be wrong, particularly if this were combined with positive selection of people with serious diseases. But some people believe that all negative selection is objectionable and therefore that all “selection for existence,” whether positive or negative, is objectionable. For if negative selection is objectionable, it seems to follow that positive selection is as well, since the attempt to bring a person of a certain type into existence is simultaneously an attempt not to bring into existence a person who is not of that type. In short, positive selection is implicitly negative as well.
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DOI 10.1086/454367
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Ways to Be Worse Off.Ian Stoner - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (4):921-949.
Disability and Adaptive Preference.Elizabeth Barnes - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):1-22.
Fanciful Examples.Ian Stoner & Jason Swartwood - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (3):325-344.
Is Disability Mere Difference?Greg Bognar - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (1):46-49.

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