Deciding to Trust

In Paul Faulkner & Thomas W. Simpson (eds.), The Philosophy of Trust. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 161-176 (2017)

Authors
Benjamin McMyler
University of Minnesota
Abstract
In this paper I argue that even if one accepts non-cognitivism about trust, the view that trust is not a species of and does not require belief, one should reject voluntarism about trust, the view that we can trust directly at will. There is good reason to think that we cannot trust directly at will, in the way that we can act, and this is so regardless of whether trust requires belief.
Keywords trust  belief  reasons  vountarism
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Trust, Belief, and the Second-Personal.Thomas W. Simpson - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):447-459.

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