Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single, Objective World

European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):195-220 (2015)

Authors
Denis McManus
University of Southampton
Abstract
Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger literature suggests, and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands, I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of Being’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject-matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ might be like
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00529.x
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References found in this work BETA

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Rethinking Expertise.H. M. Collins & Robert Evans - 2007 - University of Chicago Press.

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Being‐Towards‐Death and Owning One's Judgment.Denis McManus - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):245-272.

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