Philosophical Investigations 32 (4):295-318 (2009)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
The paper presents an interpretation of the thinking behind the early Wittgenstein's "general form of the proposition." It argues that a central role is played by the assumption that all domains of discourse are governed by the same laws of logic. The interpretation is presented partly through a comparison with ideas presented recently by Michael Potter and Peter Sullivan; the paper argues that the above assumption explains more of the key characteristics of the "general form of the proposition" than Potter and Sullivan suppose, including, in particular, its claim that the bases from which all other propositions are derived must be elementary propositions.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2009.01372.x |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind.Cora Diamond - 1991 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein.P. M. S. Hacker - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind.Cora DIAMOND - 1991 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 100 (4):577-577.
View all 32 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The 'Tractatus' and the Unity of the Proposition.Stewart Candlish & Nic Damnjanovic - 2012 - In Jl Zalabardo (ed.), Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment.Peter W. Hanks - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):121 - 146.
Was He Trying to Whisde It.P. M. S. Hacker - 2000 - In Alice Crary & Rupert J. Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein. Routledge.
Wittgenstein, Truth-Functions, and Generality.Michael Scanlan - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:175-193.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-03-19
Total views
111 ( #105,488 of 2,506,442 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,997 of 2,506,442 )
2009-03-19
Total views
111 ( #105,488 of 2,506,442 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,997 of 2,506,442 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads