Comments on can intelligence be artificial?

Philosophical Studies 71 (2):217-222 (1993)
Abstract
Doubts are raised about Dretske’s assumption that an entity can't have a representational state that governs its behavior in virtue of its content unless that internal state has been acquired via appropriate interaction with its environment. The doubts hinge on a subtle distinction between a system's acquiring an internal representational state and a system's internal state acquiring the property of being representational. Employing this distinction, it is suggested that we can pre-load machines with states "destined" to acquire specific, predictable and efficacious representational properties. The picture that results renders Dretske's general naturalistic approach to mental representation consistent with a tempered version of the classical dream in AI.
Keywords Action  Artificial Intelligence  Epistemology  Intelligence  Thought  Dretske, F
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DOI 10.1007/BF00989858
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