Analysis 63 (4):328–331 (2003)

Authors
David McNaughton
Florida State University
Piers Rawling
Florida State University
Abstract
Scanlon suggests a buck-passing account of goodness. To say that something is good is not to give a reason to, say, favour it; rather it is to say that there are such reasons. When it comes to wrongness, however, Scanlon rejects a buck-passing account: to say that j ing is wrong is, on his view, to give a sufficient moral reason not to j. Philip Stratton-Lake 2003 argues that Scanlon can evade a redundancy objection against his (Scanlon’s) view of wrongness by adopting a buck-passing account of wrongness. We argue that this manoeuvre does not succeed. Scanlon’s notion of wrongness rests on the idea of a reasonably rejectable principle. As Stratton-Lake points out, Scanlon offers two accounts, one in terms of permission, the other in terms of proscription. The permission account is tricky to formulate. Scanlon’s account (quoted in Stratton-Lake 2003: 71) might suggest any of the following four formulations (where the principles in question are principles ‘governing how one may act’ (Scanlon..
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00448
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Fitting Attitude Theories of Value.Daniel Jacobson - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Redundancy Objection, and Why Scanlon is Not a Contractualist.Tamra Frei - 2009 - Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (1):47-65.

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