Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):569 - 591 (2012)
The Perceptual Hypothesis is that we sometimes see, and thereby have non-inferential knowledge of, others' mental features. The Perceptual Hypothesis opposes Inferentialism, which is the view that our knowledge of others' mental features is always inferential. The claim that some mental features are embodied is the claim that some mental features are realised by states or processes that extend beyond the brain. The view I discuss here is that the Perceptual Hypothesis is plausible if, but only if, the mental features it claims we see are suitably embodied. Call this Embodied Perception Theory. I argue that Embodied Perception Theory is false. It doesn't follow that the Perceptual Hypothesis is implausible. The considerations which serve to undermine Embodied Perception Theory serve equally to undermine the motivations for assuming that others' mental lives are always imperceptible
|Keywords||philosophy of mind embodiment epistemic seeing direct knowledge of other minds extended mind hypothesis perception perceptual knowledge 'theory' theory the problem of other minds dretske|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Social Constraints on the Direct Perception of Emotions and Intentions.Shaun Gallagher & Somogy Varga - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):185-199.
Theory of Mind and the Unobservability of Other Minds.Vivian Bohl & Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):203-222.
How Direct is Social Perception?John Michael & Leon De Bruin - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:373-375.
Emotion Recognition as Pattern Recognition: The Relevance of Perception.Albert Newen, Anna Welpinghus & Georg Juckel - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (2):187-208.
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