In Matthew Parrott & Anita Avramides (eds.), Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

William E. S. McNeill
University of Southampton
We can know some things about each others' mental lives. The view that some of this knowledge is genuinely perceptual is getting traction. But the idea that we can see any of each others' mental states themselves - the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis - remains unpopular. Very often the view that we can perceptually know, for example, that James is angry, is thought to depend either on our awareness of James' expression or on the way James appears - versions of what I call the Expressive Hypothesis. The Expressive Hypothesis is intuitive. But in this chapter I argue that it does not allow us to do away with the thought that we sometimes perceive people's mental states. I take my arguments to provide some tentative support for the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis.
Keywords other minds  perceptual knowledge  looks  Dretske  direct social perception  foundational knowledge  direct knowledge of other minds
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References found in this work BETA

Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
Seeing And Knowing.Fred Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.
The Silence of the Senses.Charles Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.

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Citations of this work BETA

Other Minds Are Neither Seen nor Inferred.Mason Westfall - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11977-11997.

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