Abstract

I begin by identifying two approaches for comprehending actions: the analytical approach and the hermeneutical approach. I examine two analytical approaches. The first is the covering law model as defended by Ernest Nagel. The second is the practical syllogism as defended by G. H. von Wright. They are both inadequate because the interpretation they allow for is limited. That is, the contexts into which they would fit actions do not allow for the range of meanings an action may present. The hermeneutical approach, on the other hand, licenses any followable connections. Determination of relevant connections is made with reference to the question precipitating inquiry and the particular situation inquired into. ;Moreover, looking closely at the notion of cause, I show that the sort of causality the historian uses differs from the sort of causality of interest to natural and social scientists. That is, the historian is interested in examining individual causal connections as a way of comprehending particular incidents together, whereas the natural and social scientists are primarily concerned with comprehending individual events into a class of events and then connecting classes of events, which abstractly connect the individual events. In this way, prediction becomes possible. ;We cannot comprehend history in the same way in which we comprehend nature if we think that actions have no broader meaning than their place in the order of nature. While this view is abhorrent to some, it is held by many serious people. Consequently, we move from an epistemological question to an ethical question, "Ought we to try to comprehend history in the way we comprehend nature?" We must acknowledge this ethical question because the relationship between knower and thing known in history is not only an epistemological relationship, it is also a human relationship. Like all human relationships, it has an ethical dimension. ;Narrative comprehension of human action is to be preferred over more straightforwardly theoretical modes of comprehension because the narrative form is peculiarly able to comprehend alternative points of view into coherent wholes. Its ability to do this allows for the presentation of agents not simply as objects, but as subjects. One particularly important reason for this is that once we see the formal principle of unity within narrative as a movement to agreement, we can recognize this same movement as the principle underlying each person's experience. ;History may help us to re-affirm democratic values because in its recognition of the diversity of points of view it reminds us that each of us has only a perspective on the social world, and not the whole story. The reason for this, however, is not some failure of will on our part, but rather that the social world is a creation of our interpretations as well as our actions, and all of our interpretations have some role in the formation of the contexts that form the meaning of our words and deeds