On defending deontology

Ratio 11 (1):37–54 (1998)

Authors
David McNaughton
Florida State University
Piers Rawling
Florida State University
Abstract
This paper comprises three sections. First, we offer a traditional defence of deontology, in the manner of, for example, W.D. Ross (1965). The leading idea of such a defence is that the right is independent of the good. Second, we modify the now standard account of the distinction, in terms of the agent-relative/agentneutral divide, between deontology and consequentialism. (This modification is necessary if indirect consequentialism is to count as a form of consequentialism.) Third, we challenge a value-based defence of deontology proposed by Quinn (1993), Kamm (1989, 1992), and Nagel (1995)
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00050
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
.Peter Railton - 1985 - Rowman & Littlefield.
The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross & H. W. B. Joseph - 1933 - Journal of Philosophy 30 (19):517-527.
Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1994 - Philosophy 69 (267):114-116.

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Citations of this work BETA

Consequentializing and its Consequences.S. Andrew Schroeder - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1475-1497.
Civic Trust.Ryan Preston-Roedder - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
Distinguishing Agent-Relativity From Agent Neutrality.Matthew Hammerton - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):239-250.
A Better World.Ryan Preston-Roedder - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):629-644.

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