Philosophical Investigations 39 (2):281-301 (2016)

Many interpreters have noted that §§138–242 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is dominated by an attack on a platonist or classical realist conception of rules and meaning. In this paper, I address the lack of clarity that still exists concerning the nature and strength of the arguments in those sections. I argue that Wittgenstein's attack is genuinely compelling if viewed as an intricate reductio ad absurdum argument that runs all the way through §§138–201. On my reading, the well-known regress-of-interpretations argument is merely one stage in the overall reductio and is not sufficient on its own to generate the rule-following paradox.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1111/phin.12086
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,577
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
25 ( #434,946 of 2,446,589 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #456,908 of 2,446,589 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes