Tristram McPherson
Ohio State University
This paper addresses a central positive claim in Matti Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts: that a certain kind of metaphysically ambitious realist about normativity – the ardent realist – is committed to the metasemantic idea that the distinctive inferential role of normative concepts suffices to fix the extension of those concepts. I argue first that commitment to this sort of inferential role metasemantic view does nothing to secure ardent realism. I then show how the ardent realist can address Eklund’s leading challenge without appeal to distinctively metasemantic commitments.
Keywords conceptual ethics  normative realism  ardent realism
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DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2019.1656373
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References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Normative Pluriverse.Matti Eklund - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (2).
Reply to Critics.Matti Eklund - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):535-561.
Normative Roles, Conceptual Variance, and Ardent Realism About Normativity.David Plunkett - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):509-534.
Against Schmought.Matthew Vermaire - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (9):465-485.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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