Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):270-293 (2016)

Authors
Michaela McSweeney
Boston University
Abstract
I argue that, in order for us to be justified in believing that two theories are metaphysically equivalent, we must be able to conceive of them as unified into a single theory, which says nothing over and above either of them. I propose one natural way of precisifying this condition, and show that the quantifier variantist cannot meet it. I suggest that the quantifier variantist cannot meet the more general condition either, and argue that this gives the metaphysical realist a way to rule out theses like quantifier variance without appealing to fundamentality, grounding, or "levels" of reality.
Keywords metaphysical equivalence  quantifier variance  realism  fundamentality  definitional extension
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/phpe.12075
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References found in this work BETA

Putnam’s Paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Ontological Realism.Theodore Sider - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 384--423.
What Scientific Theories Could Not Be.Hans Halvorson - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (2):183-206.
Ontological Pluralism.Jason Turner - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (1):5-34.
Glymour and Quine on Theoretical Equivalence.Thomas William Barrett & Hans Halvorson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (5):467-483.

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Citations of this work BETA

Debunking Logical Ground: Distinguishing Metaphysics From Semantics.Michaela Markham McSweeney - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (2):156-170.
Intertranslatability, Theoretical Equivalence, and Perversion.Jack Woods - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):58-68.
On Translating Between Logics.Neil Dewar - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):any001.
On Classical Motion.C. D. McCoy - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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