Neosentimentalism and the valence of attitudes

Philosophical Studies 164 (3):747-765 (2013)
Abstract
Neosentimentalist accounts of value need an explanation of which of the sentiments they discuss are pro-attitudes, which attitudes are con-attitudes, and why. I argue that this project has long been neglected in the philosophical literature, even by those who make extensive use of the distinction between pro- and con-attitudes. Using the attitudes of awe and respect as exemplars, I argue that it is not at all clear what if anything makes these attitudes pro-attitudes. I conclude that neither our intuitive sense of the distinction nor the vague accounts of it that exist in the philosophical literature are especially helpful in sorting out the hard cases. What is needed is a more explicit and thorough account of what the valence of our attitudes consists in
Keywords Awe  Respect  Neosentimentalism  Valence  Pro-attitude
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9873-z
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What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On What Matters.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Spreading the Word.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Clarendon Press.

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