How to be a Responsibility-Sensitive Egalitarian: From Metaphysics to Social Practice

Political Studies (forthcoming)

Authors
Emily McTernan
University College London
Abstract
There is something attractive about combining the values of equality and responsibility, even though the view most commonly associated with doing so, of luck egalitarianism, is beset with objections. This article hence proposes an alternative approach to being a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian: one grounded on our valuable social practices of responsibility, rather than on a desire to mitigate the influence of luck on people's prospects. First, I argue that this practice-based approach better captures the very reasons that responsibility is significant for justice than does the prevalent approach among luck egalitarians: namely, the values of fairness, choice and respect. Second, I show that the remaining motivation of the luck egalitarian approach, of being ‘anti-luck’, is impoverished. I conclude by suggesting that this practice-based approach is better motivated and more palatable than existing forms of luck egalitarianism, even for those relational egalitarians who standardly criticise making egalitarianism responsibility-sensitive.
Keywords equality  luck egalitarianism  relational egalitarianism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 43,914
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Incompleteness of Luck Egalitarianism.Ryan Long - 2011 - Social Philosophy Today 27:87-96.
Equality and Information.Carl Knight & Roger Knight - 2012 - Ethical Perspectives 19 (3):469-499.
In Defence of Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2005 - Res Publica 11 (1):1-10.
The Metaphysical Case for Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2006 - Social Theory and Practice 32 (2):173-189.
Unjust Equalities.Andreas Albertsen & Sören Flinch Midtgaard - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):335-346.
Why Egalitarians Should Not Care About Equality.Shlomi Segall - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):507 - 519.
Choices Chance and Change: Luck Egalitarianism Over Time.Patrick Tomlin - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):393-407.
Hurley on Egalitarianism and the Luck-Neutralizing Aim.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2005 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (2):249-265.
Health Inequalities and Relational Egalitarianism.J. Paul Kelleher - 2016 - In Rebecca L. Walker Mara Buchbinder & Michele Rivkin-Fish (eds.), Understanding Health Inequalities and Justice: New Conversations across the Disciplines. University of North Carolina Press.
Language and Luck.Helder De Schutter & Lea Ypi - 2012 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (4):357-381.
Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):924-934.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-07-07

Total views
40 ( #210,608 of 2,266,357 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #594,521 of 2,266,357 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature