Abstract

This essay offers some fairly extensive objections to the critique of Bhaskar’s use of transcendental arguments found in chapter four of Tuukka Kaidesoja’s Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology. The essay has three sections that correspond to three sets of objections, each of which centres around a certain topic in Kaidesoja’s critique. The first concerns Kaidesoja’s appeal to the connection between transcendental arguments and Kant’s transcendental idealism to criticize Bhaskar. The second concerns Kaidesoja’s problematization of a posteriori premises in Bhaskar’s transcendental arguments. The third concerns Kaidesoja’s rejection of the prospect of ‘naturalized transcendental arguments’ and the non-transcendental ‘naturalistic arguments’ he proposes as an alternative. The overall aim of this essay is not just to defend Bhaskar’s naturalized transcendentalism against Kaidesoja’s metaphilosophical naturalism but also to help counter the association of transcendental philosophy with anti-naturalistic apriorism, foundationalism, idealism, and infalliblism frequently voiced by antitranscendental philosophers.