Holes Cannot Be Counted as Immaterial Objects

Erkenntnis 80 (4):841-852 (2015)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that the theory that holes are immaterial objects faces an objection that has traditionally been thought to be the principal difficulty with its main rival, which construes holes as material parts of material objects. Consequently, one of the principal advantages of identifying holes with immaterial objects is illusory: its apparent ease of accounting for truths about number of holes. I argue that in spite of this we should not think of holes as material parts of material objects. This is because the theory that holes are properties does not face the same difficulties as either of these theories that construe holes as objects of some sort

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Phillip John Meadows
United Arab Emirates University

Citations of this work

Holes.Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Holes.David K. Lewis & Stephanie Lewis - 1970 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):206 – 212.
Being and Almost Nothingness.Kris McDaniel - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):628-649.

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