Impermissive Bayesianism

Erkenntnis (S6):1-33 (2013)
Authors
Christopher Meacham
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Abstract
This paper examines the debate between permissive and impermissive forms of Bayesianism. It briefly discusses some considerations that might be offered by both sides of the debate, and then replies to some new arguments in favor of impermissivism offered by Roger White. First, it argues that White’s (Oxford studies in epistemology, vol 3. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 161–186, 2010) defense of Indifference Principles is unsuccessful. Second, it contends that White’s (Philos Perspect 19:445–459, 2005) arguments against permissive views do not succeed
Keywords Bayesianism  Impermissivism  Uniqueness  White
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9547-z
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References found in this work BETA

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.

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Citations of this work BETA

Immoderately Rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.
Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), MIT Handbook of Rationality. MIT Press.
The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

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