Philosophical Studies 138 (2):245-269 (2008)
This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not. Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. The proposed account also leads to counterintuitive consequences, but they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account, and no worse than those of Lewis’ account.
|Keywords||De se beliefs Updating rule Belief dynamics Sleeping beauty Elga Lewis|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Adam Elga - 2000 - Analysis 60 (2):143–147.
A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance.David Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. University of California Press. pp. 83--132.
Citations of this work BETA
Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty.Darren Bradley - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342.
Self-Location is No Problem for Conditionalization.Darren Bradley - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):393-411.
Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (5):312-320.
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