Two mistakes regarding the principal principle

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):407-431 (2010)
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Abstract

This paper examines two mistakes regarding David Lewis’ Principal Principle that have appeared in the recent literature. These particular mistakes are worth looking at for several reasons: The thoughts that lead to these mistakes are natural ones, the principles that result from these mistakes are untenable, and these mistakes have led to significant misconceptions regarding the role of admissibility and time. After correcting these mistakes, the paper discusses the correct roles of time and admissibility. With these results in hand, the paper concludes by showing that one way of formulating the chance–credence relation has a distinct advantage over its rivals

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Christopher J. G. Meacham
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.
Accuracy, Deference, and Chance.Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):43-87.
Updating, Undermining, and Independence.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):121-159.

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References found in this work

Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Correcting the guide to objective chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.

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