Two mistakes regarding the principal principle

Abstract
This paper examines two mistakes regarding David Lewis’ Principal Principle that have appeared in the recent literature. These particular mistakes are worth looking at for several reasons: The thoughts that lead to these mistakes are natural ones, the principles that result from these mistakes are untenable, and these mistakes have led to significant misconceptions regarding the role of admissibility and time. After correcting these mistakes, the paper discusses the correct roles of time and admissibility. With these results in hand, the paper concludes by showing that one way of formulating the chance–credence relation has a distinct advantage over its rivals
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axp044
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References found in this work BETA
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance.Barry Loewer - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1115--25.
Determinism and Chance.B. Loewer - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 32 (4):609-620.

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Citations of this work BETA
Updating, Undermining, and Independence.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):121-159.

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