Two mistakes regarding the principal principle
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):407-431 (2010)
Abstract
This paper examines two mistakes regarding David Lewis’ Principal Principle that have appeared in the recent literature. These particular mistakes are worth looking at for several reasons: The thoughts that lead to these mistakes are natural ones, the principles that result from these mistakes are untenable, and these mistakes have led to significant misconceptions regarding the role of admissibility and time. After correcting these mistakes, the paper discusses the correct roles of time and admissibility. With these results in hand, the paper concludes by showing that one way of formulating the chance–credence relation has a distinct advantage over its rivalsAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1093/bjps/axp044
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Citations of this work
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.
The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference.James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):axv030.
The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Precise Credences.Michael Titelbaum - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPaper Foundation. pp. 1-55.
Updating, Undermining, and Independence.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):121-159.
References found in this work
A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
Determinism and Chance.Barry Loewer - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 32 (4):609-620.
