Ratio 18 (3):306-316 (2005)
We argue that A. Damasio’s (1994) Somatic Marker hypothesis can explain why humans don’t generally suffer from the frame problem, arguably the greatest obstacle facing the Computational Theory of Mind. This involves showing how humans with damaged emotional centers are best understood as actually suffering from the frame problem. We are then able to show that, paradoxically, these results provide evidence for the Computational Theory of Mind, and in addition call into question the very distinction between easy and hard problems in the contemporary philosophy of mind.
|Keywords||Computation Emotion Frame Metaphysics Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
The Mind's New Science: A History Of The Cognitive Revolution.Howard Gardner - 1987 - Basic Books.
Citations of this work BETA
Emotion, Cognition and Artificial Intelligence.Jason Megill - 2014 - Minds and Machines 24 (2):189-199.
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