Authors
Neil Mehta
Yale-NUS College
Abstract
Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account, all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge-centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge-centered accounts
Keywords epistemic normativity  norms of assertion  norms of action  norms of belief  Timothy Williamson  assertion  knowledge norm
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12222
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

P, but You Don’T Know That P.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690.
Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Two accounts of assertion.Martin Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.
The Knowledge Norm of Apt Practical Reasoning.Andy Mueller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5395-5414.

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