Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3223-3229 (2016)

Authors
Neil Mehta
Yale-NUS College
Todd Ganson
Oberlin College
Abstract
According to phenomenal particularism, external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. Mehta criticizes this view, and French and Gomes :451–460, 2016) have attempted to show that phenomenal particularists have the resources to respond to Mehta’s criticisms. We argue that French and Gomes have failed to appreciate the force of Mehta’s original arguments. When properly interpreted, Mehta’s arguments provide a strong case in favor of phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character.
Keywords Phenomenal particularism  Phenomenal generalism  Phenomenal character  Naive realism  Particularity of experience
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0659-6
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience.Neil Mehta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (6):311-331.
On the Particularity of Experience.Anil Gomes & Craig French - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):451-460.
Relational Vs Kantian Responses to Berkeley's Puzzle.John Campbell - 2011 - In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Similarity.Sam Clarke & Alfonso Anaya - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Overlap.Jonathan Morgan - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1243-1253.

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