The Common Kind Theory and The Concept of Perceptual Experience

Erkenntnis 88 (7):2847-2865 (2023)
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Abstract

In this paper, I advance a new hypothesis about what the ordinary concept of perceptual experience might be. To a first approximation, my hypothesis is that it is the concept of something that seems to present mind-independent objects. Along the way, I reveal two important errors in Michael Martin’s argument for the very different view that the ordinary concept of perceptual experience is the concept of something that is impersonally introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception. This conceptual work is significant because it provides three pieces of good news for the common kind theorist.

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Neil Mehta
Yale-NUS College

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