A corrective to Bovens and Hartmann’s measure of coherence

Philosophical Studies 133 (2):151 - 180 (2007)
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Bovens and Hartmann (Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) propose to analyze coherence as a confidence-boosting property. On the basis of this idea, they construct a new probabilistic theory of coherence. In this paper, I will attempt to show that the resulting measure of coherence clashes with some of the intuitions that motivate it. Also, I will try to show that this clash is not due to the view on coherence as a confidence-boosting property or to the general features of the model that Bovens and Hartmann use to analyze coherence. It will turn out that there is at least one other measure that is similarly based on the concept of a confidence-boosting property, but does not have the same counterintuitive results.



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References found in this work

The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.
Is coherence truth conducive?T. Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338-345.
What is the problem of coherence and truth?Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):246-272.
Is coherence truth conducive?Tomoji Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338–345.

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