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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown by Mohammad AzadpurSayeh Meisami (bio)Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown. By Mohammad Azadpur. London: Routledge, 2020. Pp. 128. Paperback $48.95, isbn 978-1-03-204868-9. It is a herculean task to put into a meaningful conversation two philosophical discourses which are centuries apart not only in time but in methods and missions. This may even be regarded as a futile attempt from the perspective of evolutionist ideology which tends to see in the temporal progress of human civilization a one-way approximation to truth. The evolutionist ideology of modernity regardless of its various manifestations and methodologies, is an epitome of modern western intellectual narcissism. For example, despite their conflicting methods and philosophical systems, Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Hegel equally follow the modernist ideology of progress culminating in the Eurocentric hegemony of scientism which treats pre-modern philosophical traditions as historical/ornamental things of the past which belong in the museums of intellectual history. However, the Eurocentric model has been exposed in its many faces and come under powerful criticisms by both western and non-western intellectuals over the past few decades. One important critical stronghold belongs to contemporary Islamic philosophers who have embarked on a revival of Islamic philosophy in its own right. The best among these philosophers do not repeat the mistake of othering; instead they work on facilitating conversations. The last two books by Mohammad Azadpur are important contributions to this endeavor. The philosophical goal of Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna, as described by its author, is to use Avicenna's texts as a shield against "the unwarranted philosophical encroachment of natural science enthusiasts on epistemology and metaphysics" (p. 4). To accomplish this goal, Azadpur offers a deep study of analytic philosophers, most prominently Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell, in comparison with each other on the one hand and with the medieval Persian philosopher, Avicenna (d. 1037) on the other. He finds himself justified in this comparison as Sellars and McDowell themselves "place value on engaging the history of philosophy" (p. 1). The aim of the comparison is to show that despite the usefulness of the analytical toolkit for a more sophisticated reading of Avicenna's position on the relation between sense perception and intellection, the latter provides a more consistent view of the problem in the absence of the [End Page 1] scientism that Sellars suffers from. Meanwhile, we find Sellars under the influence of Kant and in comparison to some key figures of analytic philosophy such as W. V. Quine, Richard Rorty, and Donald Davidson. Within the confinement of these pages, it is impossible to review all the ideas and arguments in Azadpur's book, but here is what the reader can expect to find therein in a nutshell. After an informative Introduction that captures the gist of the book, the author devotes Chapter One to Sellars' criticism of an empiricist legacy in epistemology which is famously referred to as "the Myth of the Given," namely, the grounding of empirical knowledge in sensory experience without the latter having any grounds in the conceptual/linguistic space of reason. While not denying "non-inferential" knowledge about the world, Sellars rejects "the thesis that the non-inferential knowledge of matter of fact is itself unjustified by other knowledge." (p. 9). To explain Sellars' position with an example, to know what is "blue" is to recognize it as belonging to a "this-such" nexus in the space of reason/language. This means that my reception of something as "blue" is not the mere result of natural interactions between my vision and the world, but also due to the place of "blue" among a host of other concepts such as red, yellow, green in my conceptual/linguistic space of reason. In his criticism of the empiricist myth, Sellars commends Kantian epistemology for presenting sensibility and understanding in cooperation with each other. However, he does not consider Kantian theory of sense perception sufficient to explain sensory justification because he believes that in the absence of a full-fledged scientific account, Kant's theory of sense impressions lingers at the level of "empty abstractions." Azadpur strongly disagrees with Sellars' criticism...