Being ourselves and knowing ourselves: An adverbial account of mental representations

Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):605-619 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper takes an evolutionary approach to what we are, namely autopoietic systems with a first person perspective on our surroundings and ourselves. This in contrast with Thomas Metzinger

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,757

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
91 (#232,120)

6 months
15 (#212,687)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Monica Meijsing
Tilburg University

References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
Self-reference and self-awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
The content of perceptual experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosopical Quarterly 44 (175):190-205.
Propositional attitudes.Jerry Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (4):501-23.

View all 16 references / Add more references