Modeling inference of mental states
Abstract
Behavior oftentimes allows for many possible interpretations in terms of mental states, such as goals, beliefs, desires, and intentions. Reasoning about the relation between behavior and mental states is therefore considered to be an effortful process. We argue that people use simple strategies to deal with high cognitive demands of mental state inference. To test this hypothesis, we developed a computational cognitive model, which was able to simulate previous empirical findings: In two-player games, people apply simple strategies at first. They only start revising their strategies when these do not pay off. The model could simulate these findings by recursively attributing its own problem solving skills to the other player, thus increasing the complexity of its own inferences. The model was validated by means of a comparison with findings from a developmental study in which the children demonstrated similar strategic developments.Author's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
Modeling inference of mental states: As simple as possible, as complex as necessary.Ben Meijering, Niels A. Taatgen, Hedderik van Rijn & Rineke Verbrugge - 2014 - Interaction Studies 15 (3):455-477.
Modeling inference of mental states: As simple as possible, as complex as necessary.Ben Meijering, Niels A. Taatgen, Hedderik van Rijn & Rineke Verbrugge - 2014 - Interaction Studies 15 (3):455-477.
Folk Psychology and Social Inference: Everyday Solutions to the Problem of Other Minds.Daniel Robert Ames - 1999 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
Subjectivity, Real Intentionality, and Animal Minds.Sara Jane Worley - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Learning to apply theory of mind.Rineke Verbrugge & Lisette Mol - 2008 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (4):489-511.
Folk psychology, consciousness, and context effects.Adam Arico - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):371-393.
A problem for Wegner and colleagues' model of the sense of agency.Glenn Carruthers - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):341-357.
Rational Inference of Beliefs and Desires From Emotional Expressions.Yang Wu, Chris L. Baker, Joshua B. Tenenbaum & Laura E. Schulz - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (3):850-884.
Spatial inference: No difference between mental images and mental models.Markus Knauff & Christoph Schlieder - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (4):589-590.
How it is not "just like diabetes": Mental disorders and the moral psychologist.Nomy Arpaly - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):282–298.
The Belief-Desire Model and the Nature of Value Judgments.Gustavo Mauricio Ortiz-Millan - 2003 - Dissertation, Columbia University
Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness.Justin Sytsma - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):700-711.
The process of inference.Christopher Mole - 2018 - In Rowland Stout (ed.), Process, Action, and Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 149-167.
Analytics
Added to PP
2020-10-16
Downloads
5 (#1,169,879)
6 months
1 (#450,993)
2020-10-16
Downloads
5 (#1,169,879)
6 months
1 (#450,993)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Five-Year-Olds’ Systematic Errors in Second-Order False Belief Tasks Are Due to First-Order Theory of Mind Strategy Selection: A Computational Modeling Study.Burcu Arslan, Niels A. Taatgen & Rineke Verbrugge - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
Studying strategies and types of players: experiments, logics and cognitive models.Sujata Ghosh & Rineke Verbrugge - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4265-4307.
Introduction to Special Issue.Marjorie McShane - 2014 - Interaction Studies. Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies / Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies 15 (3):404-425.
References found in this work
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”?Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie & Uta Frith - 1985 - Cognition 21 (1):37-46.
Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception.H. Wimmer - 1983 - Cognition 13 (1):103-128.
Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory.Alison Gopnik & Henry M. Wellman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.
An Integrated Theory of the Mind.John R. Anderson, Daniel Bothell, Michael D. Byrne, Scott Douglass, Christian Lebiere & Yulin Qin - 2004 - Psychological Review 111 (4):1036-1060.
Action understanding as inverse planning.Chris L. Baker, Rebecca Saxe & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2009 - Cognition 113 (3):329-349.