Synthese 157 (3):347 - 360 (2007)
AbstractIf coherence is to have justificatory status, as some analytical philosophers think it has, it must be truth-conducive, if perhaps only under certain specific conditions. This paper is a critical discussion of some recent arguments that seek to show that under no reasonable conditions can coherence be truth-conducive. More specifically, it considers Bovens and Hartmann’s and Olsson’s “impossibility results,” which attempt to show that coherence cannot possibly be a truth-conducive property. We point to various ways in which the advocates of a coherence theory of justification may attempt to divert the threat of these results.
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Citations of this work
New Hope for Shogenji's Coherence Measure.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):125-142.
The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.
Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Probabilistic Coherence Measures: A Psychological Study of Coherence Assessment.Jakob Koscholke & Marc Jekel - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4).
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Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - London and New York: Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.