Etyka 10:105-117 (1972)

Abstract
The article provides a critical analysis and a comparison of G. E. Moore and Ch. L. Stevenson’s accounts of meaning of evaluative terms. The author shows how these two accounts are interrelated and points out that although Moore never accepted emotivism himself he did not preclude the recognition of that theory as true in the future.
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DOI 10.14394/etyka.258
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