Noûs 37 (3):447–470 (2003)

Alfred Mele
Florida State University
Claims about agents’ abilities—practical abilities—are common in theliterature on free will, moral responsibility, moral obligation, personalautonomy, weakness of will, and related topics. These claims typicallyignore differences among various kinds or levels of practical ability. Inthis article, using ‘A’ as an action variable, I distinguish among threekinds or levels: simple ability toA; ability toAintentionally; and a morereliable kind of ability toAassociated with promising toA. I believe thatattention to them will foster progress on the topics I mentioned. Substan-tiating that belief—by making progress on these topics in light of suchattention—is a project for other occasions. My aim here is to lay a partialfoundation for that project.
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0068.00446
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Papers.J. L. Austin - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Agents’ Abilities.Romy Jaster - 2020 - Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.
Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
Reasons and Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):214-235.
Unable to Do the Impossible.Anthony Nguyen - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):585-602.
Able to Do the Impossible.Jack Spencer - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):466-497.

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