Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (1):pp. 77-92 (2010)

Yitzhak Melamed
Johns Hopkins University
Like many of his contemporaries, Hegel considered Spinoza a modern reviver of ancient Eleatic monism, in whose system “all determinate content is swallowed up as radically null and void”. This characterization of Spinoza as denying the reality of the world of finite things had a lasting influence on the perception of Spinoza in the two centuries that followed. In this article, I take these claims of Hegel to task and evaluate their validity. Although Hegel’s official argument for the unreality of modes in Spinoza’s system will turn out to be unsound, I do believe there is one crucial line in Spinoza’s system – Spinoza’s rather weak and functional conception of individuality – which provides some support for Hegel’s reading of Spinoza.
Keywords Hegel  Spinoza  German Idealism  Acosmism  Pantheism  Salomon Maimon  Modes  Eleatics  Parmenides  Monism
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DOI 10.1353/hph.0.0180
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Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason.Karolina Hübner - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):58-88.
Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason.Karolina Hübner - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):58-88.
Hegel’s Idealist Reading of Spinoza.Samuel Newlands - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (2):100-108.

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