Noûs 26 (3):281-302 (1992)
Pristine belief/desire psychology has its limitations. Recognizing this, some have attempted to fill various gaps by adding more of the same, but at higher levels. Thus, for example, second-order desires have been imported into a more stream- lined view to explicate such important notions as freedom of the will, personhood, and valuing. I believe that we need to branch out as well as up, augmenting a familiar 'philosophical psychology' with psychological items that are irreducible to beliefs and desires (for support, see Mele 1987 and 1992). That theme will be left largely in the background here, however. The issue to be explored is a narrower one: the place of higher-order desires in a proper conception of continent and incontinent behavior. My guiding question is whether an action's counting as continent or incontinent depends upon the agent's having at the time a pertinent higher-order desire. The answer that I shall defend is, in a word, 'No.'.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Second-Order Preferences and Instrumental Rationality.Donald W. Bruckner - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (4):367-385.
Similar books and articles
Augustine on Liberty of the Higher-Order Will.John J. Davenport - 2007 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:67-89.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Three Conceptions of Rational Agency.R. Jay Wallace - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):217-242.
Motivation-Encompassing Attitudes.Christopher G. Framarin - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):121 – 130.
Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads124 ( #39,018 of 2,169,384 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #345,461 of 2,169,384 )
How can I increase my downloads?