Can physicalism be non-reductive?

Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296 (2008)

Authors
Andrew Melnyk
University of Missouri, Columbia
Abstract
Can physicalism (or materialism) be non-reductive? I provide an opinionated survey of the debate on this question. I suggest that attempts to formulate non-reductive physicalism by appeal to claims of event identity, supervenience, or realization have produced doctrines that fail either to be physicalist or to be non-reductive. Then I treat in more detail a recent attempt to formulate non-reductive physicalism by Derk Pereboom, but argue that it fares no better.
Keywords physicalism  reductionism  non-reductive materialism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00184.x
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References found in this work BETA

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.

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Citations of this work BETA

Defining Physicalism.Alyssa Ney - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1033-1048.
Physicalism, Not Scientism.Alyssa Ney - forthcoming - In Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels & Rene van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientism: Prospects and Problems. Oxford University Press.
Metaphysical Constraints, Primitivism, and Reduction.Michael Bertrand - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (4):503-521.

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