Free Will and Luck

Oxford University Press (2006)
Authors
Alfred Mele
Florida State University
Abstract
Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will
Keywords Chance  Fortune  Fate and fatalism  Free will and determinism  Libertarianism
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Reprint years 2008
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Call number BD595.M45 2006
ISBN(s) 0195374398   0195305043   9780195305043     9780195374391
DOI 10.1080/13869790701306028
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References found in this work BETA

The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Bounds of Freedom.Galen Strawson - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 441-460.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.
The Zygote Argument is Invalid: Now What?Kristin M. Mickelson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2911-2929.
Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):263-286.

View all 82 citations / Add more citations

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Humean Compatibilism.Helen Beebee & Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):201-223.
Lucky Agents, Big and Little: Should Size Really Matter?David Blumenfeld - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):311-319.
Is It All Just a Matter of Luck?Timothy O'connor - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):157 – 161.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Alfred Mele's Metaphysical Freedom?E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.
Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):96-104.
Free Will and Luck: Reply to Critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.

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