Intentional action

Noûs 28 (1):39-68 (1994)
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Abstract

We shall formulate an analysis of the ordinary notion of intentional action that clarifies a commonsense distinction between intentional and nonintentional action. Our analysis will build on some typically neglected considerations about relations between lucky action and intentional action. It will highlight the often- overlooked role of evidential considerations in intentional action, thus identifying the key role of certain epistemological considerations in action theory. We shall also explain why some vagueness is indispensable in a characterization of intentional action as ordinarily understood.

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Author Profiles

Alfred Mele
Florida State University
Paul K. Moser
Loyola University, Chicago

Citations of this work

Oppressive Double Binds.Sukaina Hirji - 2021 - Ethics 131 (4):643-669.
Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.

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