Intentional action

Noûs 28 (1):39-68 (1994)
We shall formulate an analysis of the ordinary notion of intentional action that clarifies a commonsense distinction between intentional and nonintentional action. Our analysis will build on some typically neglected considerations about relations between lucky action and intentional action. It will highlight the often- overlooked role of evidential considerations in intentional action, thus identifying the key role of certain epistemological considerations in action theory. We shall also explain why some vagueness is indispensable in a characterization of intentional action as ordinarily understood.
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DOI 10.2307/2215919
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Joshua Shepherd (2014). The Contours of Control. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):395-411.

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