Incontinent Belief

Abstract
Brian McLaughlin, in “Incontinent Belief” (Journal of Philosophical Research 15 [1989-90] , pp. 115-26), takes issue with my investigation, in lrrationality (Oxford University Press, 1987), of a doxastic analogue of akratic action. He deems what I term “strict akratic belief” philosophically uninteresting. In the present paper, I explain that this assessment rests on a serious confusion about the sort of possibility that is at issue in my chapter on the topic, correct a variety of misimpressions, and rebut McLaughlin’s arguments as they apply to the psychological possibility of strict akratic belief and to the etiology of beliefs generally
Keywords epistemic akrasia
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DOI 10.5840/jpr_1991_31
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