Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):259-285 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Closure is the principle that a person, who knows a proposition p and knows that p entails q, also knows q. Closure is usually regarded as expressing the commonplace assumption that persons can increase their knowledge through inference from propositions they already know. In this paper, I will not discuss whether closure as a general principle is true. The aim of this paper is to explore the various relations between closure and knowledge through inference. I will show that closure can hold for two propositions p and q for numerous different reasons. The standard reason that S knows q through inference from p, if S knows p and knows that p entails q, is only one of them. Therefore, the relations between closure and inferential knowledge are more complex than one might suspect.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,698

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On the Tracking Account of Inferential Knowledge.Bin Zhao - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
A strategy for assessing closure.Peter Murphy - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):365 - 383.
Knowledge is closed under analytic content.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5339-5353.
Epistemic Closure and Skepticism.John A. Barker & Fred Adams - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (2):221-246.
Knowledge, Assertion, and Inference.Peter Baumann - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):487-490.
A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism.Nevin Climenhaga - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York, NY: Routledge.
A Problem for the Closure Argument.Philip Atkins & Ian Nance - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):36-49.


Added to PP

84 (#199,118)

6 months
9 (#454,914)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Guido Melchior
University of Graz

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references