Authors
Hugh Mellor
Cambridge University
Abstract
Abstract The paper develops a unified account of both deterministic and indeterministic laws of nature which inherits the merits but not the defects of the best existing accounts. As in Armstrong's account, laws are embodied in facts about universals; but not in higher?order relations between them, and the necessity of laws is not primitive but results from their containing chances of 0 or 1. As in the Ramsey?Lewis account, law statements would be the general axioms and theorems of the simplest deductive theory of everything; but because laws are not so defined, simplicity of statement is not a criterion of law?hood
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/02698599008573355
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,360
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
What is a Law of Nature?D. M. Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Laws of Nature, Natural History, and the Description of the World.James W. McAllister - 1997 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (3):245 – 258.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Deterministic Chance.Luke Glynn - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):51–80.
The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws.Alexander Bird - 2005 - Foundations of Science 10 (4):353-70.
The Argument From Laws of Nature Reassessed.Richard Swinburne - 2004 - In M. Ruse & W. Dembski (eds.), Debating Design: From Darwin to Dna. Cambridge University Press.
Dispositions and Ceteris Paribus Laws.Alice Drewery - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):723-733.
The Dispositional Essentialist View of Properties and Laws.Anjan Chakravartty - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):393 – 413.
Do Chances Receive Equal Treatment Under the Laws? Or: Must Chances Be Probabilities?Marc Lange - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):383-403.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
145 ( #73,166 of 2,448,854 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #444,630 of 2,448,854 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes