Philosophical Review 104 (3):387-423 (1995)

Alfred Mele
Florida State University
The term 'motivation' has considerable currency both in moral philosophy and in the philosophy of mind. It appears in debates between internalists and externalists about moral judgments and moral reasons, in the related controversy over moral realism, and in explanatory schemes for purposive behavior offered in the philosophy of mind. But what is motivation? My aim in this paper is to elucidate a notion of motivation associated with a popular perspective on intentional conduct, a perspective that accords states of mind an important causal/explanatory bearing on such behavior. My strategy is to develop an account of a central species of motivation. Space constraints and my own limitations preclude my offering a complete account of motivation here; however, the account to be developed illuminates motivation as a whole.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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DOI 10.2307/2185634
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The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire.Amy Kind - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):421-439.
Agents' Abilities.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):447–470.
Mapping Moral Motivation.Eve Garrard & David McNaughton - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):45-59.

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