Noninstrumental rationalizing

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):236–250 (1998)
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A central notion in Donald Davidson's philosophy of mind and action is "rationalization," a species of causal explanation designed in part to reveal the point or purpose of the explananda. An analogue of this notion - noninstrumental rationalization - merits serious attention. I develop an account of this species of rationalization and display its utility in explaining the production of certain desires and of motivationally biased beliefs.



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Alfred Mele
Florida State University

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An agentive non-intentionalist theory of self-deception.Kevin Lynch - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):779-798.

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